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NOTES AND COMMENTS
as an important reference point from which to analyze the proper
federal-state distribution of the copyright power.
RICHARD FRANK BIRIBAUER
EXCEPTIONS TO SCHWINN'S PER SE RULE:
THEIR VALIDITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUTURE
Agreements which in some manner affect the flow of goods and
services from the producer to the ultimate consumer are relatively
common in the commercial world. However, since § 1 of the Sherman
Act' forbids contracts and other agreements "in restraint of trade,"
such agreements are subject to attack by the federal govern-
ment, disadvantaged competitors, customers and other aggrieved
parties2 on the grounds that the resulting restrictions are anticompe-
'Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided,
That nothing contianed in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render
illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the
resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or contained of which
bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor
of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by
others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public
policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the
commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such
contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition
under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the preceding
proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for
the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any
commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between pro-
ducers or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors,
or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in
competition with each other. Every person who shall make any con-
tract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections
1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
'Section Sixteen of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), permits private indi-
viduals to institute antitrust suits. See note 83 infra. At the same time, § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides for recovery of treble damages in private
antitrust suits. See note 84 infra.
19741
644 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
titive and therefore illegal restraints of trade. In some litigation based
on § 1, courts interpret restraint of trade to mean unreasonable re-
straint of trade, and in such cases, the agreements involved are ana-
lyzed in light of the rule of reason. Application of the rule "requires
an evaluation of the purpose and effect of the agreement and the
relative power of the parties in the determination of whether the
practices in question constitute an unreasonable, and thus unlawful,
restraint of trade."'4 In contrast, some restraints scrutinized under § 1
are considered so "pernicious ' 5 that it is conclusively presumed that
their only purpose is the elimination of competition;' such practices
are classified as per se unreasonable and are therefore unlawful.7 For
instance, unless permitted by state fair trade laws,8 resale price main-
tenance agreements are per se unlawful.9
Since the depth of a trial court's inquiry and the amount of evi-
dence it will consider depend upon whether the per se rule or the rule
of reason is applied, the procedural choice between the two rules is
often determinative of the final, substantive outcome of the litiga-
tion. Procedurally, application of the rule of reason permits a full
evidentiary hearing and a case-by-case consideration of all available
facts.'0 It allows an examination of a restrictive agreement's purpose
3See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); U.S. v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). "[The rule of
reason, in the light of the principles of law and the public policy which the act embod-
ies, must be applied." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). See
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
'Comment, Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 457, 459 (1971).
5E.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1958).
'See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
'See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (vertical price
fixing); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements in the
form of "preferential routing" clauses); Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951), and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898), modified and afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (market division); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price fixing).
'Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), grants states the power
to pass legislation permitting "fair trading" of products in intrastate transactions. For
text of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see note 1 supra.
'E.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
'"Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139, 1151 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Oppen-
heim].
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and effect" and "opens the way to reliance upon a broad range of
discretion in weighing the evidence of defenses of justification com-
patible with the purposes of the antitrust statutes."'" On the other
hand, once a particular fact situation, practice or procedure has been
classified as among those considered per se unreasonable, any inquiry
into the particular facts alleged in justification of that situation,
practice or procedure is foreclosed.' 3 In essence, "[t]he per se illegal-
ity doctrine operates by converting predetermined single-fact catego-
ries into fixed rules of law."'" However, per se rules dictated by the
Supreme Court are generally phrased in such sweeping terms that the
results of their literal application to specific fact situations are often
unacceptable to the lower courts.'5 Consequently, whenever a new per
se rule is enunciated, exceptions to that rule almost inevitably
emerge from subsequent litigation. 6 The exceptions arising out of the
per se rule formulated to govern the restraints in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. '7 vividly illustrate this phenomenon.' 8 An
analysis of those exceptions indicates three things: (1) in many cir-
cumstances where the Schwinn per se rule appears to apply, trial
courts are nonetheless often willing to inquire into the purpose of the
"The words power, purpose and effect are often used together when analyzing
restraints of trade. However, the existence of "power" becomes crucial only when the
actual offense of monopolizing is charged in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Only
purpose and effect are requisite for a finding that § 1 has been violated. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
"Oppenheim, supra note 10, at 1151.
"Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (1958).
"Oppenheim, supra note 10, at 1151-52.
sSee Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965):
Alongside cases announcing a sweeping per se formulation of the law
there has always existed a line of cases refusing to apply it. Doubtless
some of the cases in the latter group were wrongfully decided, but it
would be naive to write them all off as simply incorrect or aberra-
tional. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the literal terms of the
per se rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements
demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that
those rules, as usually stated, are inadequate.
Id. at 777. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
"For an unsuccessful attempt to create an exception to the per se rule enunciated
in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), which forbade horizontally im-
posed territorial restrictions, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp.
1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd and remanded, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See also Note, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 241-47 (1972); Comment, Horizontal
Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457 (1971).
"388 U.S. 365 (1967).
"See notes 62-180 and accompanying text infra.
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restraints, their effect and other business or economic justifications;
(2) the Schwinn per se rule is therefore not as rigid as some others,
such as the per se rule applying to resale price maintenance
schemes;" and (3) the Schwinn per se rule can rather easily be
avoided in many situations.
Schwinn and Its Legacy
An understanding of Schwinn and the subsequent lower court
limitations of its per se rule necessitates some knowledge of the
nature of trade restraints. Trade restraints, or restrictive agreements,
are classified according to their source. Schwinn presented a problem
of both horizontal and vertical trade restraints, though the Supreme
Court considered only the vertical restrictions since no appeal was
taken from the district court's disposition of the horizontal elements
of the case.2" Vertical restrictions result from agreements between
firms at successive stages of the distribution system; i.e., they occur
between manufacturer and wholesaler, wholesaler and retailer, man-
ufacturer and retailer or they may occur in consequence of an agree-
ment among all three levels of a particular distribution system. Hori-
zontal restrictions result from agreements among firms at the same
stage of the distribution process. The parties are often competitors or
at least prospective competitors. When analyzing and classifying re-
strictive agreements, however, the distinction between vertical and
horizontal restraints often becomes blurred and there is no readily
applied bright-line test by which to categorize them.21
"Note 9 supra.
2Schwinn's distributors had organized themselves to form the Schwinn Cycle
Distributors Association. The district court found that the distributors' acquiescence
in the territorial restrictions was "horizontal in nature, and whether agreed upon after
being imposed or even merely suggested from above in a vertical manner by the
manufacturer [did] not alter its illegality and violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
The district court holding in this regard was consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See note 21
infra. The district court also found that a conspiracy existed between Schwinn and four
midwestern cycle distributors by which certain overlapping counties were divided by
the distributors and that those distributors refused to compete against each other in
the rigidly divided counties. Without actually classifying the conspiracy as either
vertical or horizontal, the court held that it was a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
237 F. Supp. at 342. The court further ruled that the horizontal restrictions, the
conspiracy and the vertically imposed portions of the territorial restrictions on the sale
of bicycles which the distributors had purchased all constituted per se violations of § 1
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 343.
"For instance, General Motors inserts "location clauses" in all of its dealers con-
tracts which permit the dealer to sell only from a location approved by General Motors.
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As a practical matter, the imposition of trade restraints results in
a form of market control which lies between the extremes of com-
pletely independent dealing and total vertical or horizontal integra-
tion.2 Those who adopt restrictive agreements generally seek to jus-
tify them as a means of effectively penetrating market areas" or of
promoting new products and services,24 or as a mechanism whereby
competition from mass merchandisers,2 large chain stores2" and well-
established competitors" can be met. Such trade restraints inevitably
limit competition in at least one facet of the market place, but at the
same time they may actually strengthen competition in some other
respect.2s
In Schwinn, the Supreme Court was confronted with a system of
vertically imposed customer and territorial restrictions which
Schwinn contended were necessary to meet the competition of mass
merchandisers such as Sears and Montgomery-Ward.2 Besides the
assertion made in Schwinn, a number of other contentions have also
been made in defense of such vertical restrictions. First, they may
expand market access. Distributors are often unwilling to accept new
products unless they receive guarantees of exclusive distributorship"
and of freedom from intrabrand competition. This may be an espe-
cially important consideration with new, high risk products." Sec-
ond, such agreements often increase market exposure and ensure that
However, several Los Angeles area dealers violated this clause and sold through dis-
count houses causing complaints on the part of other dealers. General Motors then
enforced the location clauses against the errant deilers. Without ruling on the validity
of the location clauses, the Supreme Court ruled that because the dealers' complaints
resulted in action by General Motors and also because the dealers "policed" the sys-
tem, the result was a "classic [horizontal] conspiracy in restraint of trade." United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966).
"Cf. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and
Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 506 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Preston].
2ISnap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
"See generally United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also, Jerrold Electronics Corp. v.
Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
'United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
2ISandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
"See notes 29-36 and accompanying text infra.
nUnited States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1967).
"See notes 62-66 and accompanying text infra.
31See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). See generally United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961); Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d
653 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
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new products receive proper "exploitation," an opportunity that oth-
erwise might not be available. If a manufacturer can guarantee a
specific area or group of customers to a distributor, that distributor
may be willing to undertake more extensive promotional and service
obligations with respect to a particular product.2 Third, by limiting
territories or customer groupings, markets may be more readily iden-
tified and more thoroughly penetrated. 3  Finally, such restrictions
allow manufacturers to select dealers consistent with the image pro-
moted through their advertising and other merchandising efforts.34 In
short, restrictive agreements as to territory and customers often per-
mit more concentrated effort and prevent overlapping of promotional
expenditures and activity.3 5 Depending on the industry and existing
trade practices, some vertical restraints will not alter patterns of
distribution to any significant degree while others will alter those
patterns drastically. Regardless, vertically imposed restrictive agree-
ments, like mergers, inevitably reduce the number of independent
decisions made within a market area.3
The particular system of vertical restrictions in Schwinn was
imposed on distributors and retailers through the use of franchise
agreements.3 7 Under those agreements, distributors were assigned ter-
ritories in which they had exclusive rights; they were not permitted
to sell outside of their assigned areas and could sell only to franchised
retail dealers.3 8 Schwinn also imposed customer restrictions on its
32Cf. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 435 (1966).
"3See Preston, supra note 22, at 511; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After
Schwinn and Sealy, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181, 1182-83 (1967).
"Some manufacturers desire to cultivate an image of product excellence and con-
sequent consumer satisfaction. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 381 n.7 (1967).
"Preston, supra note 22, at 511.
'Implicit in a number of Supreme Court decisions is the conviction that small
independent businessmen should be preserved. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 333, 346 (1962). Restrictive agreements reduce the freedom of
those businessmen to trade as they desire. Consequently, where restraints act to stifle
competition while simultaneously limiting the independent dealers' freedom of action,
they are generally per se invalid. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Unfortunately, the
per se ruling does not always have the desired effect of preserving independent busi-
nessmen. See note 54 infra.
7One writer contends that the restrictions were not imposed by use of the franchise
agreements. See Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 669 (1968). However, the
assumption that they were imposed by franchise agreements pervades both the district
court and Supreme Court opinions.
u388 U.S. at 371.
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retail dealers, who could sell only to consumers. They were also for-
bidden from selling to unfranchised dealers for the purpose of further
sale.39 An important part of the Schwinn distribution and franchising
system was the "Schwinn Plan" which accounted for seventy-five
percent of all sales." Under the Schwinn Plan distributors took orders
from retail dealers. Schwinn then shipped bicycles directly to the
retailer, extended credit and paid a commission to the distributor.4'
Although agency and consignment arrangements were used to a small
degree,42 the remainder of Schwinn's sales was largely to distributors
who then resold the bicycles to franchised retailers." Thus the
Schwinn Plan, coupled with customer and territorial restrictions on
agency, consignment, Schwinn Plan and regular sales gave Schwinn
effective control of its distribution system without the need for verti-
cal integration.4
Though the district court found the customer restrictions valid,
it ruled that the territorial restrictions on the resale of bicycles pur-
chased by wholesale distributors constituted a per se violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.45 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court
as to the illegality of territorial restrictions but reversed as to the
'Id. at 370-71.
1°Id. at 370 n.3.
"Id. at 370.
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 328 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
By the time the litigation reached the Supreme Court, agency arrangements accounted
for a relatively minor part of Schwinn's sales, and consignment arrangements had been
eliminated altogether. 388 U.S. at 370 n.3. Perhaps Schwinn eliminated the consign-
ment arrangements because they are a relatively expensive and complicated method
of distribution due to the extensive record-keeping requirements of a consignment
system and the need for detailed contractual provisions. For example, under the
method used by Schwinn, bicycles were shipped to distributors' warehouses while
Schwinn insured the bicycles and continued to carry them on its books and balance
sheet as part of manufacturer's inventory. When a bicycle was withdrawn for delivery
to a retail dealer, the distributor remitted the "wholesale" price of the bicycle to
Schwinn. By means of this rather complicated process, Schwinn retained title to all
consigned bicycles and accessories until it received the full distributor's purchase
price. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 328 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
u237 F. Supp. at 328.
"See note 54 infra and text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
1237 F. Supp. t 343. The district court further held on the basis of other evidence
that horizontal restraints along with a conspiracy to divide territories and to eliminate
intraband competition existed, all of which constituted per se violations of § 1. Id. at
342-43. See note 20 supra. The Government also charged price fixing by Schwinn alone
and a conspiracy to fix prices between Schwinn and its dealers. On this matter the
district couit ruled that the evidence was inadequate and found for Schwinn and its
dealers. 237 F. Supp. at 328-33. The Government did not appeal the district court's
price fixing determination.
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customer restrictions, holding instead that the same principle must
apply to both types of restrictions.46 The Court concluded that it is
per se unreasonable for a manufacturer to restrict the customers with
whom wholesale distributors and retail dealers can trade after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over the product:47
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he
has parted with dominion over the product, and his effort
thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product
may be transferred-whether by explicit agreement or by si-
lent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a per
se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.4"
At the same time, the Supreme Court stated that agency or con-
signment arrangements and the Schwinn Plan restrictive distribution
system might not be justified in all situations by the presence of
competition from mass merchandisers or even by a demonstrated
need to meet that competition.49 However, the Court ruled that such
vertically imposed restraints would not constitute per se violations of
the antitrust laws where price fixing was absent and where alterna-
tive supplies of similar, competitive products were available to un-
franchised distributors and retailers.-" After determining that price
fixing was not at issue and that alternative, competitive products did
exist,5 the Supreme Court examined the Schwinn Plan and the
agency and consignment arrangements under the rule of reason. In
its rule of reason analysis, the Court stated that two further factors
were required before such restraints would be ruled valid: (1) the
manufacturer must retain actual ownership of the goods in question
including dominion, title and risk of loss; and (2) the distributors or
retailers must be indistinguishable in function from agents or sales-
men.5" Finding both of these factors present, the Court upheld the
validity of the Schwinn Plan and of the agency and consignment
methods of distribution.53 The Schwinn opinion explicitly recognized
that application of the per se rule to such arrangements would dis-





"Id. The Government had alleged price fixing in its original complaint, but the
district court found inadequate evidence to support the charge. 237 F. Supp. at 328-
33. The Government did not appeal this determination. See note 45 supra.
52388 U.S. at 381.
"Id. at 382.
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courage franchising, thereby severely hampering the smaller busi-
nessman in his effort to compete with mass merchandisers, as well
as accelerating the trend toward vertical integration."
Notwithstanding the Court's concern for the small businessman,
the per se rule enunciated in Schwinn elicited a considerable amount
of criticism,5 5 as have per se rules in general." Forbidding vertically
. 541d. at 380. In spite of the Supreme Court's concern for the small businessman
and desire to avoid vertical integration where possible, Schwinn has found that the
strictures imposed by the decision have made it advantageous, from a marketing
standpoint, to integrate. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 595, 610 n.60 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pollock], citing Keck, The
Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAw. 669, 686-87 (1968). The integration resulted despite Gov-
ernment assurances in its brief that forward integration was "unlikely," "an entirely
remote possibility," and "wholly lacking in credibility." Pollock, supra, at 610 n.60,
citing Brief for Appellant at 29, 50, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1968).
The argument is often made that decisions such as Schwinn encourage vertical
integration by forbidding marketing arrangements among firms at different levels of
the distribution process (i.e., vertical agreements) altogether or by subjecting them to
close scrutiny. If a firm's financial status forecloses the option of vertical integration,
it may become a prime takeover target for another corporation or it may even go
bankrupt. Critics contend that prohibitions against vertical marketing agreements
"enhance the advantage integrated firms have over their unintegrated competi-
tors. . . . [U]nless the antitrust laws tolerate these restrictions, this application of
the Sherman Act will deter use of the franchise device and merely accelerate the
disappearance of smaller independent concerns." Zimmerman, Distribution Restric-
tions After Sealy & Schwinn, 12 ANTrrRUST BULL. 1181, 1183 (1967). It should be noted
that this quote is taken out of context. The author of the quoted article was First
Assistant in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department at the time of Schwinn
and Sealy. This part of his article merely discusses what those who desire to consum-
mate vertical agreements allege will be the result of the Antitrust Division's actions.
In certain instances, such as the Schwinn situation, the critics have been proven
correct. However, there are significant factors which discourage vertical integration.
First, distribution is a capital intensive, low profit activity. Many firms prefer to apply
their capital elsewhere if their marketing goals can be achieved by other means. Sec-
ond, most distributors carry a wide variety of products, thus spreading their overhead
over a wider base. Third, complicated management and service problems exist at the
lower levels of distribution which discourage forward integration when workable alter-
natives are available. See generally Preston, supra note 22. As a result, there are many
instances where vertical integration occurs only as a last resort, if at all.
-See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. I.
REv. 1667 (1967). 'Form [was] exalted over substance to a degree unparalleled in
the history of antitrust." Id. at 1684. See also Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW.
669 (1968); McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested
Resale Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 A.B.A. ANTrrRusT L.J. 137 (1968); Williams,
Distribution and the Sherman Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn, and
Sealy, 1967 DUKE L.J. 732; Pollock, supra note 54. "[T]he teaching of Schwinn is that
in antitrust cases form is more important than substance." Pollock, supra note 54, at
1974]
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imposed customer and territorial restraints on goods purchased by
distributors and retailers constituted a new application of the per se
rule, one that has resulted in a number of judicially created excep-
595. Since Mr. Pollock served as counsel to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. throughout the
litigation, his opinion of the decision is hardly surprising.
Part of the reason for the criticism leveled at the Schwinn decision may lie in the
fact that four years earlier the Supreme Court refused to affirm summary judgment
against a truck manufacturer even though vertical customer and territorial restrictions
existed along with unlawful price fixing. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963). The district court had ruled that White Motor's franchise contracts as well
as the price fixing agreements were per se invalid. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
The Court affirmed the price fixing portion of the lower court judgment but held that
the legality of the territorial and customer limitations embodied in the franchise con-
tracts should be determined only after a full trial. On this matter, the Court stated
that it did "not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which the
arrangement emerge[d] to be certain [of their effect on competition]." 372 U.S. at
263. However, instead of a new trial White Motors agreed to a consent decree. Conse-
quently, the extensive information which the Supreme Court envisioned would result
from a full trial was never forthcoming. Thus, only four years after White Motors with
little new information available on the actual effect of vertically imposed customer and
territorial restrictions on goods purchased by distributors and retailers, it is under-
standable that the Schwinn decision would cause considerable consternation and com-
ment. A decision finding the customer and territorial restraints unlawful under the rule
of reason may have been more palatable to the antitrust defense bar and would proba-
bly have elicited fewer unfavorable comments.
A second factor which may have prompted some of the adverse commentary is the
questionable validity of the Court's partial reliance on "the ancient rule against re-
straints on alienation." 388 U.S. at 380. "With all deference, 'the ancient rule against
restraints on alienation' would appear to be no more relevant to the solution of current
distribution problems than the Rule in Shelley's Case would be for solving problems
in the merger field." Pollock, supra note 54, at 601.
A third factor which may have caused some of the criticism is the fact that
Schwinn has integrated forward as a result of the decision. Schwinn has absorbed the
distribution function into its corporate structure despite assurances to the Court in the
Government brief that such a move on Schwinn's part was highly unlikely. See note
54 supra.
5"There has been much recent commentary on the wisdom of per se rules." United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972), citing Comment,
Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457
(1971); Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis and Prognosis, 15
N.Y.L.F. 39 (1969); Note, Selected Antitrust Problems of the Franchisor: Exclusive
Agreements, Territorial Restrictions, and Franchise Termination, 22 U. FL4,. L. REv.
260 (1969); Sadd, Antitrust Symposium: Territorial and Customer Restrictions After
Sealy and Schwinn, 38 U. CiN. L. REv. 249 (1969); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
In Topco, Mr. Justice Marshall stated that "courts are of limited utility in exam-
ining difficult economic problems." 405 U.S. at 609. Without per se rules, he argued
that courts would be "free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory" leaving
uncertainty in their wake. Id. at 609 n.10. However, lower courts often refuse to apply
per se rules according to their literal terms. Knowing this, businessmen and lawyers
attempt to circumvent per se rules and out of their efforts lower courts often fashion
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tions.7 Though some per se rules, such as that governing resale price
maintenance, are quite rigorously applied,5 attempts by business-
men to circumvent per se rules and the subsequent limitation of those
rules by the lower courts are relatively common occurrences in anti-
trust law.59 Thus, an important part of the Schwinn legacy is the
exceptions which have arisen to the per se rule enunciated therein,
accompanied by a concomitant degree of uncertainty as to exactly
what vertical customer and territorial restrictions the courts will
allow."0 Yet many businessmen would probably prefer this uncer-
tainty to the results of a strict application of the rule.
exceptions to and limitations upon those rules. Thus it sometimes becomes doubtful
as to exactly what restraints the courts will allow and which ones they will forbid by
application of a per se rule. See notes 62-180 and accompanying text infra. Conse-
quently, the quality of certainty which Mr. Justice Marshall attributes to per se rules
is often ephemeral.
Furthermore, the courts' inability to deal with complex economic concepts and
problems may not be as great as Mr. Justice Marshall asserts. In the same term in
which the Topco opinion was written, the Court went to great lengths to commend a
district court for its treatment of a problem requiring "predictions and assumptions
concerning future economic and business events." Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562, 578 (1972); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 622
n.10 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This was an explicit recognition that courts are
quite capable of dealing with economic realities and their ramifications.
Perhaps a significant part of the rationale behind per se rules lies in the fact that
their application to a particular case or set of facts shortens the trial drastically. Once
certain restraints, such as price fixing, are found to exist, it is conclusively presumed
that their only purpose is the elimination of competition and they are per se unreasona-
ble. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). Further inquiry into
their effect is not required thus reducing the length of trial regarding the per se aspects
of the case. Schwinn provides an example of the length of time required for a full
inquiry. The trial consumed seventy days of actual litigation, not to mention pretrial
hearings and related matters to which the district court had to devote its time. Fur-
thermore, a record of twenty-three volumes evolved from the trial proceedings. With-
out the benefit of per se rules, four such trials would keep a district court judge busy
for an entire year. Nonetheless, while application of a per se rule may speed resolution
of a particular case, there is no assurance either that justice is done or that the intent
of Congress is fulfilled. Indeed, the gist of many of the articles criticizing per se rules
seems to be that expediency alone-should not support a conclusion of presumptive or
per se illegality.
7See notes 62-180 and accompanying text infra.
mSee, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 73 (1911).
"See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965). See note 15 supra.
OIn a recent opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall stated that per se rules contribute to
certainty in the law. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10
(1972). When exceptions to those rules arise, however, uncertainty may actually result
instead of certainty. See note 56 supra.
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The restrictions which the Supreme Court found per se invalid in
Schwinn had the purpose and effect of directly limiting the customers
to whom and the territories in which distributors and retailers could
sell after the manufacturer had parted with dominion over the bicy-
cles." However, an analysis of the exceptions which have emerged in
response to the Schwinn per se rule indicates that where trade restric-
tions result in indirect customer or territorial limitations, lower
courts have exhibited considerable tolerance. Those exceptions also
reveal a variety of ways to avoid the consequences of that rule.
Exceptions to Schwinn Under Exclusive Distributorship Rulings
One method manufacturers have adopted to avoid the Schwinn
per se rule is the use of exclusive distributorships implemented
through unilateral refusals to deal with particular distributors or re-
tailers.2 Such vertical confinements have long been held valid.6 Ex-
clusive distributorships implemented through unilateral refusals to
deal occur when a manufacturer selects one dealer in a particular area
to distribute or retail his products and simultaneously refuses to sell
to any other dealer within that area. 4 Where the geographical area
in question is quite large, the practical effect of an exclusive distribu-
torship may be the indirect imposition of customer and territorial
restraints. Nonetheless, absent any monopolistic, predatory, coercive
or other improper motive or purpose, exclusive distributorships im-
plemented through unilateral refusals to deal are permitted in recog-
nition of the right of each businessman to trade as he desires." In-
deed, the Schwinn decision explicitly recognized and approved their
61388 U.S. at 382. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
2See, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d
1093 (3d Cir. 1972); Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Peerless Dental
Supply Co., Inc. v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 283 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
63E.g., Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). See generally Barber, Refusals to Deal under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Barber].
"Agreements resulting from unilateral refusals to deal present a separate problem.
See, e.g., Barber, supra note 63; Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban
on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 SUPREME COURT REv. 258. See also Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
"See generally cases cited in note 62 supra.The use of promises of exclusive dis-
tributorship by manufacturers has been held a valid bargaining tool where coercive
purpose is not present. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d
418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
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use as long as other similar products are readily available to compet-
ing distributors and retailers.66
One of several recent cases in which the exclusive distributorship
concept was analyzed and applied consistently with its underlying
rationale was Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke &
Liquors, Ltd. 7 In Seagram, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a
situation wherein a large distiller, Seagram & Sons, became dissatis-
fied with the performance of its Hawaiian distributor, Hawaiian
Oke. 5 For this reason and also because it was necessary as a means
of more effectively promoting its entire product line, Seagram
switched exclusive distributors which forced Hawaiian Oke out of
business. Hawaiian Oke then sued for treble damages and the jury
returned a verdict in its favor. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
ruling that a manufacturer may properly grant a distributor an exclu-
sive distributorship or franchise even if the result operates to "cut
off" another distributor. 9 Though the effect of Seagram's change of
distributors and subsequent refusal to deal was Hawaiian Oke's insol-
vency and elimination as a competitor, the court of appeals found
that Seagram's purpose had not been to force insolvency upon
Hawaiian Oke. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that exclusive
distributorship agreements are permissible as long as their purpose
is not the economic elimination of the former exclusive distributor"
or some other anticompetitive or monopolistic objective.7' The court
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967):
[A manufacturer] of a product other and equivalent brands of which
are readily available in the market may select his customers, and for
this purpose he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom, alone, he
will sell his goods. . . . If the restraint stops at that point-if nothing
more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's
own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive
products are readily available to others, the restriction, on these facts
alone, would not violate the Sherman Act.
See also REPORT OF THE ArroRNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ANTITRUST
LAWS 27-29 (1955); Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Con-
duct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 590 (1965); Turner, The
Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals
to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
Whether other competitive products are available is usually a question for the
jury. See, e.g., Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Serv., Inc., 383 F.2d 97,
105 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968).
6416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
6416 F.2d at 80.
6Id. at 76. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Hawaiian Oke's other claims that it
had been eliminated as a distributor as a result of a group boycott, intercorporate
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ruled that none of these elements existed and further stated that in
the absence of an improper purpose, the validity of exclusive distribu-
torships has long been recognized."
In contrast, some courts have found it necessary to stretch the
exclusive distributorship concept to a significant degree. One case
which arguably lies within this group is Williams v. Independent
News Co.,7 3 in which the Third Circuit virtually restructured a con-
tract in order to find an exclusive distributorship agreement, thereby
permitting a vertical trade confinement or restraint. Independent
News Co., a comic book distributor, had an exclusive distributor-
ship 74 agreement with a comic book publisher to market all of its
comic books. Any unsold comic books were returned to the publisher
for subsequent disposal as off-sale full-copy return comic books,
which are defined as noncurrent comic books not purchased on the
retail market and returned to the publisher through the distribution
chain with their covers and full contents intact.7 Upon receiving the
noncurrent comics, the publisher credited Independent's account for
"2Id. at 76, citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967);
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992 (1957); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522, 524-25 (1948).
73485 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1973).
7 The Third Circuit actually referred to the arrangement as an exclusive dealership
rather than an exclusive distributorship. The two terms are not mutually exclusive but
they are distinct concepts, though courts often improperly use them interchangeably.
Exclusive distributorships occur when a manufacturer selects one dealer in a particular
area to distribute or retail its products. This does not mean that the dealer is forbidden
to handle other competing lines. On the other hand, an exclusive dealership results
when a distributor or retailer chooses to deal in the product of only one manufacturer
to the exclusion of all competing manufacturers' products. A dealer may be the only
dealer for a particular product within a given area and at the same time handle only
that one product thereby being both an exclusive distributor and an exclusive dealer.
Ideally, it is the manufacturer who chooses to use only one distributor or retailer in a
particular area and it is the dealer who chooses to handle only one of several similar
and competing products. However, sometimes the manufacturer forces an exclusive
dealership on a distributor or retailer through the use of contract termination threats,
intimidation and coercion. When this occurs, the exclusive arrangement is invalid and
cannot be enforced by the manufacturer. See, e.g., Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959); Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v.
Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
Such holdings are not uncommon outside the automobile and oil industries. See, e.g.,
Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940
(1955) (enforcement of exclusive dealing contracts with threats, intimidation and coer-
cion forbidden; enforcement of sales contracts with distributors and dealers by provi-
sions which permit termination on short notice also forbidden).
7 485 F.2d at 1101.
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the comics' full wholesale price" and then sold them at a drastically
reduced rate to a third party who agreed to use them only as prem-
iums." Instead, the third party sold them to Williams. Williams in
turn distributed them to other wholesalers who sold them to small
retailers, such as "mom and pop" type stores,78 which did not ordinar-
ily sell current cover comic books. The small retailers subsequently
sold the noncurrent comics for less than one-third their normal retail
price since the cost of those comic books to the third party who
supplied Williams was very small. Yet because a comic book's infor-
mation is not of a timely nature, noncurrent comics with their covers
and full contents intact are of exactly the same value as current comic
books to one who has not previously been exposed to a particular
issue7 -they are nondifferentiated products. 0 Thus, due to their
lower cost and equivalent "informational" value, the noncurrent
comics competed directly with the more recent editions which Inde-
pendent wholesaled through the current comic book chain of distribu-
tion.8
When Independent received word from its wholesalers of this cut-
rate competition, it asked the publisher to "police" its off-sale full-
7 Id. at 1108 (Adams, J., dissenting).
n"A premium is a comic book given away to children by a businessman as a gift
or in a prize-bag in order to attract business. Comic book premiums do not [directly]
compete with current cover comics because they are not sold to the public." Id. at 1102
n.3.
78 Apparently there exists a good size market for these no longer current
comics. There was testimony that these off-sale comics were distrib-
uted by Williams' wholesalers to "mom and pop" type stores which
did not handle current cover comic books, and which could sell these
off-sale comics for only four or five cents per copy. As appellant testi-
fied: "A comic book, if a certain person has never read it . . . is the
same as new to the party purchasing it."
Id. at 1102 n.2.
"Note 78 supra.
"Product differentiation occurs when a manufacturer attempts to make his prod-
uct different from other brands in the eyes of the consumer even though no real
difference exists. Each manufacturer tries to inculcate in the consumer's mind a feeling
that his product is superior to and slightly different from competitors' products. By
doing so, the manufacturer hopes partially to avoid price competition. Product differ-
entiation results from a combination of manufacturers' responses to specialized con-
sumer desires and of consumers' tastes responding to manufacturers' differentiation
efforts, such as advertising. Product differentiation may also result from natural causes
as well as human efforts. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 463-66 (8th ed. 1970).
Thus, nondifferentiated products are those which are identical in all ways and are
incapable of differentiation regardless of any attempted efforts by the manufacturer.
Since the content of both the current and noncurrent comic books was identical and
they were exactly the same in appearance, they were nondifferentiated products.
"1485 F.2d at 1105.
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copy return sales. 2 The publisher did so and thereafter refused to sell
any more returned comics to Williams' supplier. Williams instituted
suit requesting equitable relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act3 and
treble damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act84 for violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act."5 The jury found for Independent on a gen-
eral verdict.
86
On appeal, Williams contended that the agreement between Inde-
pendent and the publisher covered only current comic books.Y He
emphasized that after returning any unsold comics to the publisher
and receiving full credit, Independent had parted with title, domin-
ion and risk of loss. He therefore argued that as a result of the
Schwinn decision, it was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
for Independent to control the destiny and conditions of resale of the
"Id. at 1105, 1112.
'3Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and
19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such
proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages
for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the dan-
ger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunc-
tion may issue.
"Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
"Note 1 supra.
-"350 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ph. 1972).
"1485 F.2d at 1103. Williams also alleged that a conspiracy existed between Inde-
pendent and the publisher, the purpose of which was to eliminate Williams from
competition in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Third Circuit held that
Independent's request that the publisher "police" its noncurrent sales was merely an
attempt by Independent to enforce its exclusive distributorship rights. Id. at 1106.
Williams further contended that the trial court's instructions to the jury were
improper. The dissent convincingly developed the point that the charge erroneously
concentrated on the distribution system as a whole and failed to instruct the jury
properly on either the significance of the distinct segments of the distribution system
or the combination aspects of the case. Id. at 1110 (Adams, J., dissenting). Neverthe-
less, the majority held that Williams' objection to the trial court's instructions was
invalid. Id. at 1108.
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noncurrent comic books.88 However, the Third Circuit ruled that In-
dependent's exclusive distributorship contract applied to both cur-
rent and noncurrent comic books,89 even though no mention of the
noncurrent comics was made in the contract ° and in spite of the fact
that Independent had never distributed any noncurrent comic
books.' The circuit court further ruled that by requesting the pub-
lisher to "police" its noncurrent comic book sales, Independent was
merely attempting to enforce its exclusive distributorship rights.2
Under a Schwinn analysis, it appears that restrictions did exist
on the disposition of the off-sale comic books and that a ruling that
per se violations were present would have been in harmony with
Schwinn. Finding that an exclusive distributorship contract existed
as to both current and noncurrent comics required the court to stretch
both the exclusive distributorship concept and the facts. However,
the end result was demonstrably correct. A finding in favor of Wil-
liams would have put the comic book publisher in the anomalous
position of competing with himself at the retail level, while simulta-
neously diluting the value of Independent's exclusive distributor-
ship. 3 The noncurrent comic book sales would have cut directly into
Independent's current issue sales and overall profit, since comic
books are nondifferentiated products." Furthermore, because the
publisher sold the noncurrent comics to the third party at a drasti-
RId. at 1104.
"Id. at 1106.
""There is no restriction in the contract on the distribution ... of off-sale full-
copy return ... comics. And there is no provision requiring Independent's approval
before ... distribution of [those] books." Id. at 1104.
"Id.
"Id. at 1106.
"Initially, such a situation might appear to be one of simple ntraband competi-
tion but such is not the case. Intraband competition normally occurs only between
firms handling the same product at the same level of the distribution process. For
example, wholesalers who distribute the same brand may serve customers in a common
area and their pricing policies regarding that particular brand constitute intrabrand
competition. It is an extremely rare and perhaps nonexistent case when a manufacturer
engages in price competition with himself. The comic book publisher, and to some
degree Independent, were in positions normally occupied by a manufacturer. Thus,
their situation is best conceptualized by considering the case of a typical manufac-
turer. One might argue that automobile manufacturers compete with themselves, since
used cars compete with new ones, and that comic book publishers should do likewise.
However, the market for new durable goods such as automobiles is quite different from
the market for used durable goods-they are differentiated products. See note 80
supra. In contrast, there is no difference between current and noncurrent comic books
to a consumer who has not read the particular issue in question-they are nondifferen-
tiated products. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
9'See note 80 supra.
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cally reduced price, 5 the publisher's overall profit also would have
declined. Had the publisher been forced to continue his sales of non-
current comics to Williams' supplier, it is conceivable that at some
point the profits of both the publisher and Independent might have
been eliminated altogether.
One significant difference between the situation facing the Third
Circuit in Williams and that confronting the Ninth Circuit in
Seagram should be noted. Seagram & Sons made no attempt to con-
trol those to whom its new distributor could sell after Seagram parted
with title, dominion and risk of loss. In Williams, after returning
unsold comics to the publisher and receiving full credit, Independent
also parted with title, dominion and risk of loss." Yet it attempted
to limit those to whom the publisher could distribute or sell the
noncurrent comic books. Though the Third Circuit stretched the
facts and the exclusive distributorship concept considerably in order
to avoid Schwinn, the Williams decision was economically sound. It
maintained the value of Independent's exclusive distributorship con-
tract while simultaneously preserving the profitability of both Inde-
pendent and the publisher,9" a result which would not have been
possible under a strict application of the Schwinn per se rule.9 8
"3See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
"See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra. Preservation of profitable opera-
tions will not always justify either vertical or horizontal restrictions. The Supreme
Court has often stated that self-interest alone is not adequate to justify restraints of
trade. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127,
139-47 (1966).
"One other case involving the validity of an exclusive distributorship arrangement
is also worthy of note. In Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973), a manufacturer had switched to an
exclusive distributorship thus cutting off a former distributor who sued for treble
damages. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit's finding of legality was very similar to the
result reached in Seagram. 472 F.2d at 640. However, there was also a contract provi-
sion which authorized the new distributor to sell within a specific territory. The court
held that the contract provision was simply a description of the distributor's primary
marketing area and since there was no evidence that his sales were confined solely to
the described area, no per se violation existed. Id. at 640-41. Referring to Schwinn, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the per se illegality of the territorial restrictions in that case
was "predicated on the 'firm and resolute' insistence on compliance" and that the
firmness "'was grounded upon the communicated danger of termination."' Id. at 639,
citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967). Accord, Janel
Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
938 (1968). See also Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Exceptions Based on Products Liability
The Third Circuit also deviated from Schwinn in Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp.," a four-three en banc decision. Wella manufactured a
line of fifty-two different beauty and barber supplies, only two of
which were sold on a retail basis. The remainder was sold exclusively
for professional use in barber and beauty shops through Tripoli, a
wholesaler which purchased the products for further distribution to
the trade. When Wella learned that Tripoli was retailing to the public
products intended solely for barbers and beauticians, it cancelled
Tripoli's contract. Tripoli then sued for treble damages claiming that
the Schwinn decision forbade such restrictions. As justification for
the resale restrictions, Wella alleged that because the products were
dangerous in untrained hands, the restrictions were necessary to pro-
tect the public against injury and the manufacturer against potential
product liability. °0 At trial, Wella's motion for summary judgment
was granted.
On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that every manufacturer-
imposed resale restriction does not constitute a per se violation of the
antitrust laws and that as in all antitrust cases, Schwinn must be
read "in its factual context."''° For this proposition, the Third Circuit
borrowed from Schwinn itself: "Under the Sherman Act, it is unrea-
sonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and con-
fine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." ° The court noted
that no territorial restriction was imposed on Tripoli and that some
of Wella's products could cause irritation to hypersensitive skin, brit-
tleness of hair or perhaps blindness."3 The Third Circuit further
noted that barbers and beauticians must be licensed, at least partly
because of potential injury to customers from unskilled application
of certain specialized beauty products.04 Finding no indication that
Wella was trying to avoid either intraband or interbrand competition
within its chosen professional market, the majority ruled that cus-
tomer limitations are proper when their purpose is to insulate a man-
ufacturer from liability and protect the public from harm.', 5 Yet only
a few of the restricted products posed any danger to the public and
"425 F.2d 932 '(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
10Id. at 938.
'1Id. at 936.
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even their potential for harm appeared questionable. As the dissent
emphasized, while many individuals are susceptible to injury because
of allergic or other reaction to products which normally cause no ill
effects, it "would be astonishing if this well known fact would justify
a producer's restriction on the ultimate marketing of his products to
physicians and druggists."''8
A summary judgment in favor of Wella does not appear warranted
on the facts presented, at least under a literal application of the per
se rule enunciated in Schwinn. After a full hearing, the rule of rea-
son 10 7 could properly have been applied to those few products which
might conceivably have caused harm. But restraints on the remain-
ing products would be per se invalid under a Schwinn analysis and
that determination would foreclose any inquiry into the reasonable-
ness or justification for those restraints. 8 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court denied Tripoli's petition for certiorari." 9 It would be surprising
if the Court considered unimportant a case which quite arguably falls
directly within the Schwinn per se rule and yet produces a conflicting
result. Thus, the certiorari denial may indicate two things regarding
Schwinn's per se rule: (1) the possibility of consumer injury will
weigh heavily in the determination of an exception's validity even
where potential for harm is slight; and (2) the Court will allow a
manufacturer to limit his market to a particular class or profession
as long as customer and territorial restrictions are not imposed which
have the purpose and effect of limiting either interbrand or intra-
brand competition within the manufacturer's chosen market. One
other factor, the availability of other similar products on the regular
consumer market, might also enter into future decisions. As a quick
perusal of almost any magazine will attest, there is a wide variety of
competing beauty aids on the market. Had competition in this area
been less intense, a different decision might have resulted at all court
levels, especially with regard to those Wella products without harm-
ful potential.
The possibility of harm to consumers was also a factor in
Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp."' In Polytechnic, a manufac-
turer of copying machines required that lessees use only metering
' MId. at 941 (Freedman, J., dissenting).
'See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
1"See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1958). On
the interplay between per se rules and the rule of reason, see Comment, Horizontal
Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457, 460 n.24
(1971).
"'Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
"'362 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
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devices approved by Underwriters' Laboratories, a national testing
organization."' Though the case actually involved a tying arrange-
ment rather than vertically imposed customer or territorial restric-
tions, trying arrangements are also vertical in nature and the policy
considerations which determine their validity may provide valuable
guidance in future litigation concerning other vertical restrictions.
A tying arrangement involves an agreement by a party to sell a
particular product but only on the condition that the buyer purchase
another, or "tied," product or at least agree that he will not purchase
the tied or similar product from another supplier."' Section Three of
the Clayton Act governs these arrangements."' They are "unreasona-
ble in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product appreciably to restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not in substan-
tial' amount of interstate commerce is affected;"'" i.e., they are per
se invalid under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act."5
On the other hand, where a party imposes conditions premised upon
legitimate business interests as justification for a tying arrangement,
1'Id. at 3.
"'Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). "For our
purposes a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
"'Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale
of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodi-
ties, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where
the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
"'Northern Patific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), citing Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
"'International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). It has been
argued that tie-ins are tested under different criteria when attacked as violative of § 1
of the Sherman Act than when suit is brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act. Turner,
The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50
(1958). But see Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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that arrangement will be tested under the rule of reason."' In addi-
tion, when products are leased rather than sold, as in Polytechnic,
rules established for use of the leased machinery and attachments
thereto must not be disguised restraints of trade, although such rules
may set reasonable standards which all suppliers of attachment de-
vices must meet."
7
While only Xerox's own metering device had been approved by
the testing laboratory at the time of suit, the Polytechnic court noted
that other devices were not foreclosed from prospective approval and
use."' Thus, the purpose of the restrictions imposed by Xerox was not
the economic elimination of competitors from the metering device
market. Accordingly, the court ruled that no antitrust- violation oc-
curs when a manufacturer implements a policy designed to insulate
itself from product liability suits as long as that policy actually pro-
motes public safety and protects the manufacturer's equipment from
harm." 9
"'E.g., Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
See notes 117-119 and accompanying text infra.
"'International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
"1362 F. Supp. at 8.
11id. at 6.
It is well settled that a manufacturer can adopt and implement a
policy which is designed to protect its property and the users of its
property . .. [in order] to promote safety. Weather Wise Co. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 468 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
990 (1973); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge
League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940
(1971); Kendall Elevator Co. v. LBC & W Associates of South Caro-
lina, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 75 (D.S.C. 1972). Indeed, even absolute restric-
tions have been permitted where necessary to protect legitimate busi-
ness interests such as product or personal safety. Tripoli Co. v. Wella
Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
362 F. Supp. at 6. "The right of a lessor of equipment to establish conditions or
specifications to which other products must conform in order to be used in combination
with the lessor's own products has been preserved for many years in classic antitrust
cases." Id. at 6-7 n.8, citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397
(1947); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
"One's ownership rights in tangible personal property include a right to prohibit
the attachment of devices thereto, or to retain authority to decide whether such attach-
ment shall be made." 362 F. Supp. at 10, citing In Re Farrell Publishing Corp., 165 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd sub horn. Hendler v. Cuneo Eastern Press, Inc., 279
F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1960); Bliss v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Ore. 634, 321 P.2d 324 (1959);
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Miner, 11 Ill. App.2d 44, 136 N.E.2d 1 (1956); Krause v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N.W.2d 41 (1951). But see United
States v. U.S. Int'l Cigar Mach. Co., 1956 Trade Cases 68,871 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(manufacturer of cigar making machinery and subsidiary distributor prohibited by
consent decree from forbidding alterations of or attachments to leased machinery).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Polytechnic, the possibility of personal injury from the use of
unapproved metering devices appears to have been more real than
the potential for harm from the beauty aids in Tripoli. ' Further-
more, like the customer and territorial restrictions in Tripoli, the
metering device tying arrangement in Polytechnic was also vertically
imposed, and there are a number of similarities between tying agree-
ments and other vertical restrictions.' 2 ' Thus, as a means of avoiding
the Schwinn per se rule, Polytechnic may provide well-founded anal-
ogies for future cases where vertical restrictions are combined with
valid possibilities of consumer injury or product liability.
Implications for the Future
In Schwinn, the Supreme Court stated that agency or consign-
ment restrictive distribution schemes might not be justified in all
situations by the presence of competition from mass merchandisers
or even by a demonstrated need to meet that competition, but that
such vertically imposed restraints would not constitute per se viola-
tions of the antitrust laws in the presence of two factors: (1) the
absence of price fixing; and (2) the existence of alternative supplies
of similar, competitive products for unfranchised wholesalers and
retailers."' In this respect, the ruling parallels the Court's earlier
See also IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936): "Appellant is not
prevented from proclaiming the virtues of its own cards and warning against the danger
of using, in its machines, cards which do not conform to the necessary specifications,
or even from making its leases conditional upon the use of cards which conform to
them."
'See notes 105-108 and accompanying text supra.
'"There are many similarities between tying arrangements and vertically imposed
customer and territorial restraints. Vertical customer and territorial restrictions are
imposed by a manufacturer on a distributor or retailer and dictate the customers to
whom or the territory in which those businessmen may sell a manufacturer's product.
See notes 29-48 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, in Polytechnic, the manufac-
turer imposed restrictions on its lessees as to the meter manufacturers with whom they
could deal; i.e., lessees could utilize only Underwriters' Laboratories approved meters.
Xerox actually took the restrictions one step further and, rather than applying them
to distributors or retailers as in the case of customer or territorial restrictions, applied
them to the ultimate consumer. Thus, on the facts presented in Polytechnic, it is
possible to conceptualize the tying arrangement as a customer restriction carried be-
yond its usual limit and applied to the ultimate consumer.
'=388 U.S. at 381.
We do not suggest that the unilateral adoption by a single manu-
facturer of an agency or consignment pattern and the Schwinn type
of restrictive distribution system would be justified in any and all
circumstances by the presence of the competition of mass merchandi-
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decision in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. '1 In Simpson, a retail dealer
sued for treble damages when Union Oil refused to renew his lease
solely because the dealer sold consigned gasoline for a price lower
than that fixed by Union. The Court stated that a consignment agree-
ment valid under private contract law does not insulate the price
fixing portions of the contract from the scrutiny of the antitrust laws
and that the public policy expressed in those laws must predomi-
nate. 24 The Court would not permit a comparison between a simple
agency arrangement and Union Oil's large, complicated distribution
system:
[A]n owner of an article may send it to a dealer who may in
turn undertake to sell it only at a price determined by the
owner. There is nothing illegal about that arrangement. When,
however, a "consignment" device is used to cover a vast gaso-
line distribution system, fixing prices through many retail out-
lets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the "consignment" an
agency, for then the end result of United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. . . . would be avoided merely by clever ma-
nipulation of words, not by differences in substance. 2
The Court held that Union's distribution scheme involved price fix-
ing and was therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 2" Thus,
Schwinn and Simpson are complementary holdings. Simpson stands
for the proposition that a consignment arrangment, valid inter se,
cannot immunize a price fixing scheme;'2 i.e., valid consignment
agreements and antitrust violations are by no means mutually exclu-
sive. 2  Schwinn, although sanctioning consignment and agency
methods of distribution in limited situations, expressly makes those
methods illegal per se when ancillary to price fixing.
2 9
sers and by the demonstrated need of the franchise system to meet
that competiton. But certainly, in such circumstances, the vertically
imposed distribution restraints-absent price fixing and in the pres-
ence of adequate sources of alternative products to meet the needs of
the unfranchised-may not be held to be per se violations of the Sher-
man Act. The Government, in this Court, so concedes in this case.
Id.
123377 U.S. 13 (1964).
'11d. at 18.
111d. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
111d. at 24. See also Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 344 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1965).
'11377 U.S. at 24.
'2The same is true of valid agency agreements-agency agreements valid inter se
may also be declared in violation of the antitrust laws. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d
624 (7th Cir. 1965).
"'388 U.S. at 375, 381.
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The effect of Schwinn and Simpson is shown by the decision in
United States v. General Electric Co.30 The General Electric court
was confronted with a situation in which General Electric controlled
fifty percent of the "large lamp"' 3' market in the United States. As
the parties stipulated, the consignment arrangements were valid
agency contracts under private contract law.' 32 Under the General
Electric consignment plan, GE set prices and assumed all risk of fire,
obsolescence and market price decline. 33 Since GE controlled fifty
percent of the large lamp market, the overall effect of its consignment
system was undoubtedly greater than that of the Union Oil system
in Simpson. Yet the GE system had been upheld by two previous
decisions's' and one consent decree. 35 Nonetheless, the district court
held that the effect of the consent decree and the two previous
General Electric cases had been essentially negated by subsequent
antitrust law developments, particularly the Schwinn and Simpson
decisions.'3 The consignment arrangement was therefore ruled a per
se violation of the Sherman Act, since its only purpose was improper
price fixing 37 which both Simpson and Schwinn had expressly forbid-
den in conjunction with consignment arrangements. 3 But where a
consignment system is adopted in a good faith effort to meet competi-
tion and no anticompetitive elements are present, the arrangement
will avoid per se invalidity and will be tested under the rule of rea-
son.
39
In addition to agency and consignment agreements, exclusive dis-
tributorship arrangements,' and the possible injury or product Iia-
"3358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
3"'Large lamp" is a trade term describing most types of electric lights used for
interior lighting including incandescent light bulbs, fluorescent lights and certain high
intensity discharge bulbs. Id. at 733 n.1.
11i1d. at 734.
,31d.
"'United States v. General Electric Co., 272-U.S. 476 (1926); United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
'11954 Trade Cas. 67,714 (D.N.J.).
'358 F. Supp. at 734-38.
1171d. at 743. Accord, Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"'United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967); Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
"'United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &,Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967). See also
Ludwig v. American Greetings Corp., 282 F.2d 917 (1960) (consignment system
adopted in good faith effort to meet competition upheld where no anticompetitive
elements exist).
"'See notes 62-98 and accompanying text supra.
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bility exceptions,'4 there are several other methods by which a manu-
facturer may avoid the Schwinn per se rule and still exert a large
degree of vertical control over the distribution process without verti-
cal integration. The most common of these are primary responsibility
covenants, location clauses and profit pass-overs. To some extent,
they are complementary devices and may be used individually or in
combination.
Primary responsibility covenants impose certain requirements on
distributors, dealers, retailers or franchisees as a condition of con-
tinuing their relationship with the manufacturer.' Members of the
distribution chain are free to sell in any territory and to any customer
they choose, but are required to expend an agreed amount of effort
within a specified territory on such things as advertising, promotion
and customer service. Primary responsibility covenants are especially
important where effective local sales efforts are crucial.' Such agree-
ments have been explicitly permitted by a large number of consent
decrees. '
While primary responsibility covenants set certain areas in which
specific efforts must be expended, location clauses designate the loca-
tion of a dealer's or franchisee's place of business and require the
manufacturer's or franchisor's permission to operate at another loca-
tion.4 5 Such clauses were specifically upheld in a 1942 case, Boro Hall
Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,'46 though the dissent argued that they
were prima facie unreasonable when used to control the place of sale
of new cars.' 7 As pointed out in the most recent General Electric
"'See notes 99-121 and accompanying text supra.
"'See Pollock, supra note 54, at 604.
"'See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 435 (1966); Preston, supra note 22.
'"Pollock, supra note 54, at 604, citing United States v. American Type Founders
Co., 1958 Trade Cas. $ 74,203 (D.N.J.); United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade
Cas. 74,739 (D.R.I.); United States v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 1958 Trade
Cas. 73,838 (S.D.N.Y.) United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
74,006 (W.D.N.Y.); United States v. AMI, Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. 73,097 (W.D.
Mich.); United States v. J.P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. T 72,476 (N.D. Ill.);
United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71,751 (E.D. Pa.). The Justice
Department endorsed the use of primary responsibility covenants in United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). "Insistence that each licensee shoulder primary re-
sponsibility for cultivating a particular territory would (without precluding competi-
tion among the licensees) serve the interest of the Sealy group as a whole better than
an ironclad division of territories." Pollock, supra note 54, at 604 n.46, quoting Brief
for Appellant, at 20-21, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
'45Pollock, supra note 54, at 603.
11-124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
1'Id. at 824 (Frank, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court recently had an opportun-
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decision," however, there have been significant changes in the inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws over the past several years.' It is
therefore unlikely that such clauses will escape close scrutiny where
they are used in a coercive manner' or where their presence has a
deleterious effect upon competition. On the other hand, where their
sole purpose is the thorough penetration of a market area,' 5' their
validity will probably be upheld. Because of the complexities in de-
termining the nature of their use, it is likely that location clauses will
ity to examine location clause provisions in United States v. General Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127 (1966). However, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the questions
concerning the validity of those clauses:
The Government invites us to join in the assumption, only for
purposes of this case, that the "location clause" encompasses sales by
dealers through the medium of discounters. But it urges us to hold
that, so construed, the provision is unlawful as an unreasonable re-
straint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
We need not reach these questions concerning the meaning, ef-
fect, or validity of the "location clause" or of any other provision in
the Dealer Selling Agreement, and we do not. We do not decide
whether the "location clause" may be construed to prohibit a dealer,
party to it, from selling through discounters, or whether General Mo-
tors could by unilateral action enforce the clause, so construed. We
have here a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: Joint, collaborative
action by dealers, the appellee associations, and General Motors to
eliminate a class of competitors by terminating business dealings be-
tween them and a minority of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive fran-
chised dealers of their freedom to deal through discounters if they so
choose. Against this fact of unlawful combination, the "location
clause" is of no avail. Whatever General Motors might or might not
lawfully have done to enforce individual Dealer Selling Agreements by
action within the borders of those agreements and the relationship
which each defines, is beside the point. And, because the action taken
constitutes a combination or conspiracy, it is not necessary to consider
what might be the legitimate interest of a dealer in securing compli-
ance by others with the "location clause," or the lawfulness of action
a dealer might individually take to vindicate this interest.
Id. at 139-40 (footnote omitted). The Court determined that the arrangement consti-
tuted a horizontal conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id. at 141, 143. See note 21 supra.
"'United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See notes
122-139 and accompanying text supra.
111358 F. Supp. at 735, 738.
'5When coupled with termination clauses, location clauses could conceivably be
used in a coercive manner similar to the way in which oil companies have used consign-
ment agreements. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Sun Oil Co.
v. FTC, 350 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966); Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC, 344 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1965). See also Englander Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
51For a thorough discussion of market coverage and penetration, see Preston,
supra note 22.
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be tested by the rule of reason5 2 and no per se rule will be fashioned
to govern them.
Profit pass-overs will probably be given much the same treat-
ment; they are generally combined with primary responsibility cove-
nants.53 Profit pass-overs require a distributor or retailer who sells
outside his primary responsibility area to give a certain percentage
of his gross receipts to the individual or firm in whose primary area
the sale was made,'54 thus compensating that firm for the advertising
and sales expenditures undertaken in cultivating its particular pri-
mary area.' 55 In short, these irrangements prevent one firm from
taking advantage of the marketing efforts made by another firm sell-
ing the same product and thereby receiving a "free ride."'5 6 Like
primary responsibility covenants, profit pass-overs are most common
where local sales effort is vital, though it is extremely rare when a
manufacturer of any product relies solely upon national advertising.
In almost any sales campaign, local advertising is of some impor-
tance.'57 Without profit pass-over arrangements, an interloper could
receive a large share of the advantages flowing from another firm's
efforts without making any expenditures on its own part. The imme-
diate result of such a situation would probably be reduced advertising
and other market penetration efforts by the firm with primary re-
sponsibility for the particular area,"'5 or some form of retaliation dam-
aging to the manufacturer's overall market position. The ultimate
consequence would be reduced sales of the manufacturer's product
within the specific market area.
According to a recent district court decision, Superior Bedding,
Inc. v. Serta Associates, Inc.,'5 the only relevant question in consider-
ing the validity of profit pass-overs is whether the pass-over require-
ment makes it impossible for a firm to make sales at a profit outside
its own primary area.' 0 The court found that the particular pass-over
rate under consideration had a direct relation to fixed promotional
expenses, such as sales and advertising costs, and still permitted an
" See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
"sSee text accompanying notes 142-44 supra.
"'Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).
155Id.
"'Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 435 (1966).
'11Id. "The fact that many firms use a variety of forms of advertising and other
sales efforts indicates that these forms are not perfect substitutes." Id.
1581d.
1"'353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
111Id. at 1150.
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outsider to sell within the area at a profit.'"' It therefore upheld the
pass-over's validity.
6 2
A hypothetical can be constructed, however, in which the validity
of a pass-over provision is far more questionable than the provision
in Superior Bedding. Suppose an automobile manufacturer assigns
primary responsibility areas to each of its dealers within which the
individual dealer is obligated to use his best efforts to promote the
manufacturer's product. Assume further that the wholesale price of
automobiles to the dealers is eighty percent of the suggested retail
price but that the manufacturer refunds to the dealers an .additional
eight percent of the suggested retail price for each unit sold within
the individual dealer's primary responsibility area."13 Referring to
Superior Bedding, the principal test for the validity of the hypotheti-
cal pass-over is whether a dealer can make a profit on sales outside




Before applying the Superior Bedding test to the hypothetical,
however, four preliminary observations should be made: (1) the man-
ufacturer's marketing goal is thorough penetration of each primary
responsibility area; (2) a dealer's sales effort in another's primary
area contributes relatively little to the manufacturer's overall mar-
keting program; (3) an incentive system will help the manufacturer
achieve his marketing goal and simultaneously ensure that each
dealer's greatest effort is expended within his own primary responsi-
bility area; and (4) the closer the incentive is to determining whether
a dealer profits or loses on a particular sale, the more effective that
incentive will be in controlling a dealer's activities and contributing
to the achievement of the manufacturer's marketing goals. With
these observations and the importance of the manufacturer's market-
ing goals" 5 in mind, it is probable that the twenty percent discount
1'!d.
"21d. at 1151. In the Superior Bedding case, Serta hired Arthur Young & Co., a
nationally known accounting firm, to determine the fixed expenses. From an average
figure, an appropriate pass-over percentage was determined, which the court held
valid. Id.
'"See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSES, PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 429 ( 519) (1967).
"'Note that in Superior Bedding, the payments were made from one dealer to
another, not from the manufacturer to the dealer as in the hypothetical. However, the
Superior Bedding pass-over requirement was imposed from above, and therefore its
purpose and effect was probably identical to that in the hypothetical, and both can
therefore be termed pass-overs.
"1rhis refers to the importance of the manufacturer's marketing goals from his
own perspective. From the general public's point of view, the goals may be of little or
no significance. On the other hand, they may be of extreme importance to the public
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on the wholesale price covers only a dealer's overhead, including such
things as salaries, advertising, trade-in allowances, utilities and
rental or mortgage payments. If so, the additional eight percent re-
fund on all sales within the primary responsibility area represents the
difference between making a profit and barely breaking even on each
individual sale. Thus, the eight percent refund provision appears to
fall directly within the Superior Bedding proscription.
Nonetheless, the manufacturer might argue, and perhaps validly
so, that even if the eight percent refund provision does represent the
difference between tangible pr6fit and loss on an individual sale, a
dealer's sales outside of his area of primary responsibility still con-
tribute to his marginal revenue, thus allowing fixed overhead expen-
ses to be absorbed by more sales units. However, it is doubtful
whether dealers keep records which are detailed enough to reflect a
true picture of the dealership's marginal revenue and marginal
costs.'66 Consequently, the ultimate effect of the eight percent refund
would be the almost total discouragement of sales outside a dealer's
primary responsibility area-a result virtually identical to the restric-
tions in Schwinn, though arguably less direct. Since the automobile
manufacturer parted with dominion, title and risk of loss when he
received payment from the dealer, the pass-over arrangement in the
hypothetical might be declared a per se violation of the Sherman Act
because of its similarities to the Schwinn restrictions, or a new per
se rule might be fashioned to govern such situations.
On the other hand, a rule of reason analysis using the Superior
Bedding test will likely prove adequate in the absence of widespread
abuse of the pass-over arrangement. That test is not concerned with
and have substantial effects on the price paid for goods and services. The manufac-
turer's marketing goals may be adverse to the public's interest or at least potentially
so and therefore fall under the scrutiny of the antitrust laws.
"'Marginal cost is the amount which the sale of one additional unit or automobile
adds to total costs. Conversely, it is the amount of expense which can be saved by not
making a particular sale. Marginal cost is the equivalent of the total variable costs of
"production" for that one unit; i.e., the marginal cost of each additional automobile
sale is the amount which that unit adds to variable costs including sales commissions,
mileage charges, etc.
If a dealer only breaks even on sales outside of his primary responsibility area, it
may still be advantageous for him to sell outside his primary area, at least up to some
point. Each additional sale gives a dealer a wider base over which to spread his fixed
costs and thus fixed costs per unit or per sale decline. As long as the reduction in fixed
costs per unit exceeds the variable costs added by each sale outside the primary
responsibility area, the dealer can "profitably" continue those sales. See P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONOMICS 428-40 (8th ed. 1970); C.L. HARRISS, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 392-95
(6th ed. 1968).
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the businessman's overall profit-it focuses only on whether an entre-
preneur can make a profit on each individual unit sold outside of his
primary responsibility area. Therefore, applying the Superior
Bedding standard to the hypothetical, if the eight percent refund
represents the difference between profit and loss on an automobile
sold outside a dealer's primary area, the arrangement would be in-
valid.
Another factor should also be considered in analyzing the hypo-
thetical or any pass-over type of device. A manufacturer's wholesale
prices to competitors need not be identical, but any price variance
must reflect only the different costs of doing business with the respec-
tive competitors.' 7 Where price discrimination exists, a cause of ac-
tion arises under the Robinson-Patman Act. 8 Thus, a pass-over ar-
rangement might also be open to attack on grounds of price discrimi-
nation.' 8 Regardless, the solution offered to this hypothetical is ad-
mittedly conjectural, but it illustrates the type of analysis which is
required where a profit pass-over device has been adopted in an effort
to maintain a large degree of vertical control while simultaneously
avoiding the Schwinn per se rule.
One further means of avoiding Schwinn might also be permitted.
Prior to the Schwinn decision, it was thought that a new and rela-
tively weak competitor could impose certain vertical territorial and
customer restraints as an incentive to distributors and retailers to
accept his products. Several cases had permitted such restrictions.'
In one case, Sandura Co. v. FTC,'7' a struggling manufacturer desired
to expand his sales but had few funds available for an advertising
campaign. Consequently, in return for assuming the majority of the
promotional expenses, distributors were offered closed territories with
the exclusive right to sell to retailers within those areas. The Sixth
Circuit held that the case was "barren of credible evidence that the
public would be benefited by requiring that Sandura distributors be
allowed to intrude on each other's territory.' 7 2 The court concluded
that, rather than increasing competition, the elimination of the
closed territorial arrangements would actually impair it;13 i.e., the
'"See, e.g., FrC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
1-15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
'The price discrimination claim in Superior Bedding was rejected. 353 F. Supp.
at 1151.
"'Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC,
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). See generally United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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restrictions promoted the economic well-being of the struggling firm
while also promoting interbrand competition and were therefore
valid. Though the Supreme Court's decision in White Motor Co. v.
United States74 appeared to declare that restrictions would be per-
mitted in such special circumstances, the sweeping per se rule enun-
ciated in Schwinn created a considerable amount of doubt whether
even interim restrictive measures would be tolerated as a means of
protecting new firms or products. Unfortunately, no definitive answer
has emerged which would resolve those doubts. Nevertheless, there
is language in Schwinn itself which indicates that the struggling cor-
poration will be given special consideration. The Supreme Court
noted that Arnold, Schwinn & Co. was neither "a newcomer, seeking
to break into or stay in the bicycle business . . . [nor] a 'failing
company.' "' 75 Had either situation existed, the court indicated that
the vertical restraints might have been "sheltered by the rule of rea-
son because [they were] not anticompetitive.' 7  Thus, future liti-
gants may find that Schwinn provides an exception to its own per se
rule where special circumstances exist.'
77
Conclusion
When first enunciated, the Schwinn per se rule prompted a con-
174372 U.S. 253 (1963).
275388 U.S. at 374.
6MId.
"' Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1417 (1974), may also allay some
doubts as to whether a special circumstances exception exists. In Worthen, a bylaw of
a national credit card organization forbade its members from joining competing credit
card organizations but did not attempt to limit customers or territories, fix interest
charges or limit discounts the member banks could give merchants. Though vertical
restraints were not at issue, it is possible that a differently drafted complaint might
properly have brought the question before the court. Since the requirement was im-
posed by the organization on all its members, the bylaw was arguably vertically initi-
ated and therefore similar to the Schwinn situation, though the argument is not a
particularly strong one. A ruling of this nature might depend on whether all members
of the organization sat on the board and actually made policy decisions or whether
policy was determined by only a few member banks. See generally United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Such a determination might also lead to a conclusion
similar to those which have emerged from the cases concerning the exclusive arrange-
ments which automobile manufacturers and oil companies have at times attempted
to force on their dealers. See note 74 supra.
In any event, there were two per se rules which very probably did apply to the
arrangement, those governing group boycotts [e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941)] and horizontal restraints of trade [e.g., United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
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siderable amount of controversy.' 8 Fear was expressed that manufac-
turers would eliminate the independence of their distributors and
dealers by one of two methods: (1) adoption of extensive agency and
consignment distribution systems; or (2) vertical integration."' It was
also postulated that those mariufacturers who could not afford either
of these alternatives due to limited financial resources would be
forced to continue imposing territorial and customer restrictions,
thereby risking lawsuits, or be compelled to settle for more inefficient
methods of distribution.
8 0
Certainly some fears have been realized. However, the attempts
by businessmen to circumvent the Schwinn per se rule and the subse-
quent limitations imposed upon that rule by the lower courts have
blunted the effect of the Schwinn decision to a very large degree.
Utilization of exclusive distributorships in combination with primary
responsibility covenants, location clauses and profit pass-overs still
gives businessmen wide leeway in designing a distribution system. In
addition, there are the possibilities offered by agency or consignment
arrangements and the injury or product liability exceptions. Thus,
the supposed harshness of the Schwinn per se rule has been muted
by exceptions and other methods of avoidance. An entrepreneur con-
tinues to enjoy great flexibility in determining the type of distribution
system that best conforms to the particular needs of his business.*
CHARLES BAiLY TOMB
(1967)]. Yet the Eighth Circuit refused to apply either one saying that the credit card
industry was a relatively new and very important one, doing over $8 billion of business
per year. Consequently, the court ruled that it would be a mistake to determine a case
of such importance on the basis of a per se rule and remanded it to the district court
for a full hearing on the purpose and effect of the restrictive bylaw. 485 F.2d at 129-
30. Cf. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The fact that the
Supreme Court denied certiorari may indicate that an inquiry will be permitted into
the purpose and effect of a trade restraint, other than resale price maintenance, when-
ever new circumstances arise, even though a per se rule applies to that situation. It is
worth noting that the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department filed an amicus
brief in Worthen urging the Eighth Circuit to take the course of action which it fol-
lowed.
118See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L.
REv. 1667 (1967). See also Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 669 (1968); McLaren,
Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and
Refusals to Deal, 37 A.B.A. ANTrIRusT L.J. 137 (1968); Williams, Distribution and the
Sherman Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn and Sealy, 1967 DUKE L.J. 732;
Pollock, supra note 54.
"'Pollock, supra note 54, at 605.
m Id.
*This note was completed prior to the decisions in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 1974
Trade Cas. 75,090 (10th Cir.), and GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental TV, Inc., 1974
Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir.).
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